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BOOK REVIEW
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICS, LAW, PRACTICE. BY IAN HURD.
CAMBRIDGE, NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2011. PP. IX, 282.
INDEX. $90, CLOTH; $42, PAPER
Timothy Meyer
University of Georgia School of Law
The study of international organizations (IOs) as well as the law governing them
remains a growth field over sixty‐five years after the creation of the United Nations.
Spurred by the increasing number of IOs, their varied institutional forms, and their
success in legalizing disputes that merely decades ago would have been chiefly
political issues, scholars from a variety of disciplines have sought to improve our
understanding of when and how IOs facilitate international cooperation.
International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice is a volume intended to introduce
a nonspecialist, graduate student, or practitioner to this field. The author, Ian Hurd,
is an associate professor of political science at Northwestern University, and he
approaches his study from an international relations perspective. But Hurd is a
political scientist (and one of many) thinking seriously about how law and politics
relate in the international arena. The essential thesis of his book is that IOs, and
their relationships to the states that create them, must be understood in the first
instance as creatures of their constitutive legal documents. By integrating this legal
perspective into the broader study of the relationship between states and IOs, Hurd
hopes to “transcend[] the distinction between the global government and
governance” (p. 12), where the former is the domain of formal international
organization scholarship and refers to the “particular rules that define or issue from
a specific legal body” and the latter refers to the “broad range of rules and actors
that make up the international regime on an issue” (p. 11).
In this endeavor, Hurd succeeds. His book deftly marries the analysis of the rights
and obligations created by international agreements with the broader political
environment in which those rights and obligations are exercised. Eight of the book’s
eleven chapters are devoted to explaining the international agreements creating and
controlling the operation of individual IOs. The book situates these legal structures
in the political context that determines much of state behavior and suggests lessons
as to what legal tools are likely to generate cooperation in particular political
circumstances. The chapters are nuanced and contain insights of interest to both the
novice and the veteran scholar of IOs. The book is thus valuable as a review of the
intersection of two fields‐‐international law and international organization‐‐as well
as an introduction to the complicated ways in which law and politics interact in IOs.
Chapter 1 sets forth the framework that Hurd applies to the IOs he studies. His
inquiry is organized around three questions: To what obligations do states consent
when they join an organization? Do states in practice comply with these obligations?

What powers of enforcement does the organization have? This framework places
Hurd’s book within the broader “compliance” literature in international law and
international relations. This literature is generally characterized first by asking a
legal question‐‐what obligations does international law impose on states?‐‐and
second by examining whether and under what political, legal, and economic
conditions states satisfy their legal obligations. At its most basic, the compliance
framework does not require IOs at all, focusing as it does on the relationship
between state behavior and legal rules. Hurd’s book enriches the basic compliance
framework by expressly introducing IOs as entities to which states owe obligations
and which, in turn, can play a role independent of substantive rules of conduct in
promoting compliance with those rules. Hurd also takes an expansive notion of how
relationships between IOs and states promote compliance. He notes, for example,
that while it is conventional to think of compliance as a series of conscious choices
made at discrete points of crisis, much of the work of IOs in furthering compliance is
done in quieter moments and in subtler ways.
Hurd’s emphasis on compliance as the appropriate lens through which to
understand the relationship between international law and IOs on the one hand and
state behavior on the other is standard fare in international law and international
relations, and for good reason. Institutions and the various kinds of sanctions that
they coordinate or impose can change behavior. And while certain kinds of costs can
be imposed in the absence of a legal violation, sanctions can be less costly to apply,
and therefore more effective, when they are legally authorized. This increased
effectiveness is due both to the perceived legitimacy of legal process and to the fact
that having, for example, the WTO or the UN Security Council authorize sanctions
may reduce reputational costs or retaliatory sanctions to which the sanctioning
state itself might otherwise be subject. Even in the absence of sanctions, procedures
for evaluating compliance may generate changes in state behavior through learning
or by suggesting ways in which resources can be reallocated to improve compliance
efforts. Assessments of compliance are thus a critical component of the legal
processes that change the incentives for state behavior. The significance of
compliance to law also means that data on compliance are relatively abundant,
making it useful as a dependent variable in studies of the effect of international law.
Compliance as a behavioral concept is not without its limitations, however. As Hurd
recognizes, if one is ultimately interested in how IOs or international law more
generally changes state behavior, one cannot simply look to whether states comply
with legal rules. International legal rules are an outcome of the political dynamics
among states, and, thus, showing a correlation between acceptance of legal rules
and compliance with those rules does not eliminate the possibility that states simply
agreed to rules with which they would have complied in the absence of a legal
obligation. More complicated measures of the effect of IOs and legal rules ask about
the degree of change in states’ behavior as a result of the legal rule, regardless of
whether the states’ behavior ultimately satisfies a legal standard. Measuring this
type of “effectiveness” of legal rules can be very difficult, however, as it requires a
counterfactual assessment of what a particular state would have done in the

absence of a legal obligation.
Compliance is thus a convenient, but imperfect, metric for thinking about the effect
of law on behavior. It sits uncomfortably at the intersection of international law and
international relations. On the one hand, the concept of compliance is critical for the
functioning of legal processes that create incentives for states to change behavior.
On the other hand, the concept is fraught with peril when used to make causal
claims about the behavioral effects of legal rules because the concept tells us
nothing about how states would have behaved in the absence of a legal rule.
The concept of compliance suffers from another potential shortcoming in that it can
sometimes suggest that the legality of a course of conduct can be determined in a
binary fashion, by which I mean a particular action can be classified as clearly lawful
or clearly unlawful. To be sure, a binary notion of compliance is useful, and indeed
necessary, in a variety of legal contexts. Tribunals are often required to apportion
blame and, in doing so, to reduce a complicated set of facts and relationships to a
binary question of legal responsibility. But one should not lose sight that the legal
determinacy suggested by binary resolutions of disputes is often a fiction. Even
international tribunals and dispute resolution processes often seek to clarify the law
for the purposes of facilitating an ultimate resolution through interstate
negotiations. For example, in the Gabc̆íkovoNagymaros Project case, the
International Court of Justice directed the parties to negotiate a final resolution to
their dispute over the water flow from the Danube in light of the Court’s decision,
rather than directing a particular resolution.1 Opinions such as that in Gabc̆íkovo
Nagymaros, as well as efforts to satisfy the Court’s directive to negotiate a
resolution, belie the notion that compliance can be understood purely by measuring
behavior against a legal rule. Law is often indeterminate, and thus states and IOs are
constantly involved in a process of negotiating the law’s meaning. The task of
assessing and enforcing compliance‐‐Hurd’s latter two concerns‐‐is thus
complicated by the fact that states frequently assess compliance and renegotiate the
terms of cooperation simultaneously.
Hurd is, of course, very aware of this limitation of the concept of compliance and, as
noted above, expressly averts to broader notions of legal process that lawyers often
associate with compliance. In describing constructivism, Hurd notes that the
process of interpreting and internalizing legal rules has the effect of remaking the
rules’ meaning. Moreover, his case studies are rife with disputes in which defining
the legal obligation was as important as measuring compliance. But given Hurd’s
focus on the legal powers of IOs, one might have expected a fuller discussion of the
other legal processes that international agreements and IOs establish for contesting
and renegotiating legal rules. The resolution of indeterminacy through the
enforcement processes that Hurd discusses is but one method of a constant process
of renegotiation that occurs in the shadows of politics and the procedural rules of
IOs that allocate bargaining power among states. The treaties that create IOs
1
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frequently include mechanisms, such as sunset provisions or withdrawal clauses,
that facilitate renegotiation. Because international law remains principally a system
of self‐governance in which states are both the authors and subjects of the law,
renegotiation remains critical as a tool for states in resolving cooperation problems.
Instances of renegotiation crop up in Hurd’s case studies‐‐for example, when he
discusses amendments to the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement
to permit floating exchange rates‐‐but they are not comprehensively integrated into
this account of state‐IO relations.
Having introduced the basic framework he intends to apply to his studies of
individual IOs, Hurd uses chapter 2 to review and reconceptualize academic
approaches to the study of IOs, identifying three roles for IOs and three
methodologies for their study. As he says, the “fundamental tension in international
law, which is central to the field of international organization as well, is between
state sovereignty and the commitment involved in international treaties” (p. 33).
The roles (IOs as actors, fora, and resources) and, in particular, the methodologies
(contractualism, regimes, and constructivism) that Hurd identifies vary in how they
approach this tension. Contractualism, for example, focuses on IOs as products of
delegations of state authority, while regime theory, as Hurd describes it, starts by
asking what the rules are and then asks how those rules affect state behavior.
Constructivism, again as Hurd uses that term, refers to an approach that focuses on
the processes of interaction between states and IOs.
Hurd’s discussion of methodologies is a breath of fresh air. As he notes, “[T]hese
three [methodologies] have somewhat different meanings than they generally do in
the field of International Relations theory” (p. 24). In moving beyond the traditional
categories used in international relations, Hurd helpfully clarifies different ways to
think about the place that IOs occupy in a causal account of state behavior,
unencumbered by the baggage associated with labels such realist or neoliberal
institutionalist. No one approach captures all the pathways through which IOs can
influence state behavior. Rather, each methodology can be useful, depending on the
question under study. He explains that these methodologies “are not mutually
exclusive, and indeed despite their differences the three approaches may not be in
competition with each other” (p. 32).
In subsequent chapters, Hurd turns to applying his framework to specific
institutions: the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund,
World Bank, United Nations, International Labour Organization (ILO), International
Court of Justice, International Criminal Court (ICC), and regional organizations such
as the European Union, African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. The organizations that Hurd chooses cover a breadth of different subject
matters useful to a student of IOs. Moreover, these organizations have a variety of
different purposes and powers, thus giving the reader a survey of the different ways
that states structure IOs and, in turn, how IOs manage their relationships with
states. Hurd complements his analysis of obligation, compliance, and enforcement of
each IO studied with a case study, which elucidates the workings of the organization.

For example, in his chapter on the WTO, Hurd explains the global trading system’s
three central obligations: the schedule of bound tariffs agreed to by each WTO
member, the most‐favored nation obligation, and the national treatment obligation.
After discussing the intricacies of these three obligations, Hurd then examines
compliance with the WTO, emphasizing reasons that states might cheat on their
WTO obligations, including the familiar concern that the responsiveness of
politicians to particular domestic constituencies can lead to violations that appear
unjustified in purely economic concerns. Hurd continues by briefly reviewing the
literature on the WTO dispute resolution process and discussing the ultimately
decentralized and political nature of enforcement in the WTO. Hurd concludes with
a discussion of the Shrimp/Turtle case2 to illustrate how legal and political
considerations interact within the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.
Hurd’s book is thus a valuable starting point for the international lawyer or
graduate student thinking comparatively about IOs. International lawyers are, of
course, quite comfortable thinking about IOs in an ad hoc way. But specialization
can deprive the lawyer of the comparative insights that come from studying
organizations that address different issue areas. A great virtue of Hurd’s book is that
it focuses on organizations rather than subject matter and therefore provides an
illuminating overview of the field.
At the same time, as Hurd himself suggests, the reader must be cautious not to take
large multilateral IOs as the starting point for international law, rather than as
institutions embedded in the larger legal system. The study of IOs and international
law can suffer from selection effects. Scholars study important multilateral
institutions and treaties, often to the exclusion of the dense web of bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral legal relationships that support and, in some ways,
compete with multilateralism. Indeed, in areas from human rights to free trade, the
regional and bilateral institutions are advancing cooperation in ways seemingly
unattainable in truly multilateral fora.3 Hurd is, of course, aware of this fact and
highlights it by devoting a chapter to regional organizations. To stress the
importance of organizations other than large multilateral IOs is therefore not to
criticize Hurd’s book but rather to caution readers to be aware of the scope of
Hurd’s project.
Hurd’s selection of IOs warrants a similar cautionary note about the usual level of
institutionalization and delegation to IOs. The set of IOs he chooses is useful for his
purposes because he touches upon many of the most important organizations
currently in operation. The majority, but by no means all, of the IOs that Hurd
studies are highly institutionalized, have broad mandates, and have at least some
2 United States‐‐Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products,WTODoc.WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998).
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form of independent lawmaking power. Hurd contrasts these relatively powerful
IOs with the ILO. As Hurd discusses, the ILO promulgates draft conventions that are
then subject to states’ ordinary ratification processes. Hurd describes this process as
a “unique and interesting means of reconciling IO authority with state sovereignty”
(p. 163). Rather than being unique, though, this arrangement might be more aptly
described as representative of IOs whose independent lawmaking powers are very
weak, a substantial number of IOs indeed. The UN General Assembly, for example,
makes law in the same fashion as the ILO, delegating the drafting of conventions to
subsidiary organizations such as the International Law Commission or the UN
Commission on International Trade Law, and then adopting the draft conventions at
diplomatic conferences for states’ signature and ratification. In both cases, the
ultimate decision whether to accept a new legal obligation remains with states.
Nor is this structure, in which IOs act as negotiating fora and agenda setters, rare. As
Hurd briefly acknowledges in discussing IOs as fora, many major modern
multilateral treaties create mini IOs, including the conference of the parties (COP), a
secretariat, and subsidiary bodies charged with implementation, monitoring, and
enforcement. Although not frequently studied as IOs, thinly institutionalized
organizations such as COPs are critically important to international cooperation.
The rules by which they operate frequently shape the ongoing negotiations over
how to understand, implement, and amend international agreements. Like the ILO
and the UN General Assembly, COPs (and indeed diplomatic conferences, such as the
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea) are frequently empowered to adopt
amendments or protocols that have legally binding effect only after state signature
and ratification. The relationship between modern international lawmaking and IOs
is thus properly understood as a continuum, from the pure treaty that establishes no
parallel organizational structure, through treaties that establish a secretariat or a
COP with procedural rules governing its decisions, to full‐blown constitutive treaties
such as those that create most of the organizations about which Hurd writes. While
obviously outside the scope of Hurd’s project, a comprehensive study of the
variation in procedural rules adopted by COPs and other fora‐like IOs, and the effect
of those procedural rules on the shape of international cooperation, would greatly
expand our understanding of how states use IOs. To name but one example of the
influence of rules governing COPs, the rules of the Assembly of States Parties to the
Rome Statute of the ICC required a two‐thirds vote of the full membership, or 74 out
of 111 states, to adopt amendments codifying the crime of aggression at the 2010
Kampala Review Conference. Thus, in theory, states favoring expansive aggression
amendments could have relied on numbers to overcome the resistance of the
permanent members of the Security Council and their allies. But with fewer than 72
states initially presenting credentials entitling them to vote during the conference,
and only slightly more than the necessary 74 eventually eligible to vote, consensus‐‐
and therefore compromise with the five permanent members (China, France, Russia,

the United Kingdom, and the United States)‐‐became the rule of the day.4
These minor cautionary notes about the scope of the IOs featured in the book
notwithstanding, International Organizations is a very valuable contribution in the
still developing field of international law and international relations. It is
recommended reading for those seeking an introduction to or review of the way in
which politics and law interact and define the relationship between IOs and states.
Hurd offers a useful review of approaches to the study of international
organizations and provides a valuable comparative approach to thinking about how
states use law to empower IOs and how, in turn, those IOs seek to constrain and
shape state behavior.
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